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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of seizing illegal imitations within develop-
ing countries on imitation, innovation, and economic growth. The model shows
four main results. First, a higher seizure rate does not always decrease imitative
activity in the South because it may encourage the infringer to commit repeated of-
fenses. Second, the model shows a U-shaped relationship between innovation and
the strengthening seizure rate. Third, numerical analysis indicates that a sufficiently
high seizure rate that is larger than a critical value is required to enhance economic
growth. Finally, unlike seizure, the extended model shows that a prohibition on
importing Southern illegal imitations in the North necessarily lowers imitative activ-
ities.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection has been strengthened in
developing countries (e.g., Park, 2008). However, there are still many illegal goods in
developing countries that imitate products in developed countries and infringe their IPRs,
including patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Counterfeiting and infringement have been
regarded as serious problems by foreign companies exporting or entering a market in a de-
veloping country because these illegal activities reduce the sales of the original products.
According to a questionnaire survey by the USITC (2011)1, in 2009, U.S firms conduct-
ing business in China estimated economic losses of around $48.2 billion, with 75.9% of
the losses ($36.6 billion) due to lost sales. The Japan Patent Office also reported that
Japanese firms’ lost sales due to imitation were approximately $187 million per firm in
2012. Such economic damage leads to discouraging foreign companies from exportation,
foreign direct investment, and innovation.
In China, the Administration of Industry and Commerce (AIC) and Technical Supervi-
sion Bureau (TSB) have the power to investigate infringement and punish the infringer by
imposing a fine and confiscating goods. When foreign companies detect illegal products
that infringe upon their goods, they can request that the AIC and TSB investigate the in-
fringers. Because detection and seizure happen quickly and are not expensive operations,
many firms rely on the AIC and TSB instead of bringing criminal charges. In addition,
the AIC and TSB can confiscate illegal goods independently, without an order from a
foreign firm. Their seizure activities have recently become more frequent, as seen in the
upward trend in Fig 1. However, despite the IPR enforcement by Chinese government in-
stitutions, the illegal activities do not seem to have stopped. The USITC (2011) reported
that the number of U.S. IPR-related seizures from China by the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection have grown year after year. In addition, the Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry (METI) reported that Japanese firms state that imitation has increased year
after year.2 The METI (2012) notes that “repeat offenses” often occur soon after the first
offense because the fine is relatively low compared to potential earnings and the guilty
parties employ all available methods to attempt to escape criminal punishment. This fact
means that seizure would just result in inducing imitators to infringe another product re-
peatedly
While both IPR enforcement and IPR protection are important issues, many theoret-
ical studies have exclusively focused on IPR protection policies by using an exogenous
1The U.S. International Trade Commission.
2Annual Report of Counseling Service against Imitation and Pirate 2012, in Japanese.
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Figure 1: The Number of Seizures by AIC and TSB. Source: The Japan Ministry of Economy,
Trade, and Industry, 2012.
probability of imitation (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991) or the unit cost of imitation
(e.g., Glass and Saggi, 2002) as a proxy for the strength of IPR protection. For simplicity,
these models assume that the incumbent loses monopoly power forever after the imitation
occurs. This assumption can be interpreted in two ways: (i) all imitations do not infringe
on the IPRs, or (ii) there is no legal enforcement against the illegal imitation. Clearly,
these interpretations are not realistic and contradict the previously listed empirical evi-
dence. In reality, innovators are faced with the risk of illegal imitation even if IPR protec-
tion has been strengthened in developing countries. This implies that the strengthening
IPR protection is not enough to secure the profit of innovators under the imperfect IPR
enforcement. Therefore, to investigate the IPR policies more meaningfully, we require
another framework that considers illegal imitation and IPR enforcement.
This paper analyzes the effects of strengthening IPR enforcement on illegal imitation,
innovation, and economic growth after an infringement occurs. This paper consists of
two parts. First, in a basic model, we extend the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991,
ch12), which is a quality-ladder-type North-South model. The present model incorporates
the seizure of illegal imitation into the basic North-South model. Due to the seizure, the
infringer cannot keep producing the imitative good, and the original innovator can restore
the monopoly after the seizure. The main findings of this basic model are as follows: (i)
a higher seizure rate does not always decrease the imitative activity in the South because
it may encourage the infringer to repeat offenses. (ii) there is a U-shaped relationship
between innovation and the strengthening seizure rate; and (iii) a sufficiently high seizure
rate is required to enhance the economic growth. Second, we discuss the economic im-
pact of an import prohibition on Southern illegal imitations in an extended model. This
model shows that, unlike seizures, an importing prohibition necessarily lowers imitative
activities in South.
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To my knowledge, only a few studies have investigated the effects of seizure of imita-
tion in a North-South general equilibrium model.3 In related literature, Hori and Morita
(2011) studied a similar problem by using an exogenous seizure rate by the Southern gov-
ernment. An imitation good is immediately excluded from the market with a constant
probability in each period. In contrast to the existing model, both the Northern follow-
ers (potential firms in North) and Northern leaders (Northern innovators whose products
have been imitated by Southern firms) engage in R&D. Although a higher seizure rate
always lowers the imitation rate, the effects of a higher seizure rate on the innovation rate
are complicated. When the seizure rate is weak, a higher seizure rate always decreases
total volume of R&D investment because both Northern followers and Northern leaders
simultaneously lose their incentive to innovate. On the other hand, when the seizure rate
is sufficiently strong, a higher seizure rate increases the level of Northern followers’ R&D
but stifles the Northern leaders’ R&D investment. In this case, because the effect on total
R&D investment is not known analytically, Hori and Morita (2011) conducted a numer-
ical analysis. Sinha (2006) also analyzed the effect of patent enforcement in the South
on Northern innovation in a two-period partial equilibrium model. He assumed that the
Southern legal system can detect imitations and debar Southern imitators from using old
Northern technologies, with an exogenous probability. He demonstrated that a higher de-
tection rate leads to Northern firms losing their incentive to innovate new technologies be-
cause the strong patent enforcement against the infringement of old technologies promises
high profits to Northern firms, even if the innovation fails. Consequently, stronger patent
enforcement discourages Northern innovation.4
The present paper has several advantages compared with existing literature. First, the
present model is a Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model, while the Sinha (2006)
analysis used a two-period partial equilibrium model. Hori and Morita (2011) used a
quasilinear utility function, and there is no income effect. For this reason, their model
is a type of partial equilibrium. Second, the present paper analytically provides non-
3Difficulty with the calculation may have prevented existing studies from modeling seizures. In many
North-South models, a Northern innovator generally loses the profit after a Southern firm imitates the
Northern good, for simplicity. Such a setup enables us to easily calculate the expected discounted total
profit of the Northern firms. However, imitation seizure restores the Northern innovators’ profits, which
makes the calculation of the expected discounted total profit more difficult.
4Sinha (2006) only captures the negative effect of patent enforcement on innovation due to a limita-
tion of the two-period framework. Indeed, his model does not consider patent enforcement against new
technologies, which is invented in the second period. If his model, like the present model, assumed that
a stronger IPR enforcement increases profits of innovators who invented new technologies, his monotonic
effect on innovation would change.
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monotonic effects of strengthened IPR enforcement on imitation and innovation. Nu-
merous existing theories have already demonstrated non-monotonic effects of strength-
ening IPR protection on innovation and economic growth (e.g., Furukawa 2007; Horii
and Iwaisako 2007). Using a North-South model, Akiyama and Furukawa (2009) demon-
strated an inverted U-shaped relationship between the Southern IPR protection and inno-
vation in the North. Although the present paper is in line with the previous literature, we
focus on IPR enforcement rather than the protection. Finally, the present model examines
the effect of prohibiting imports of Southern illegal imitations on imitation and innova-
tion. Many existing models assume that Southern imitations are consumed not only by
domestic households but also by Northern households, for simplicity. However, in real-
ity, the Northern government seizes the illegal product, as is done by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection. To investigate IPR enforcement policies more realistically, the effects
of import prohibition should be examined.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the basic North-
South model with seizure. Section 3 analyzes the effect of strengthening the seizure rate
on imitation, innovation, and growth rate. In Section 4, we extend the model and consider
the import prohibition on Southern illegal imitations. Finally, Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Setup
The world economy consists of two countries, North (N ) and South (S). There is no pop-
ulation growth and no tariffs. All households serve their labor supply inelastically and
labor cannot move across the countries. There are two final goods: A is the agricultural
good and X is the manufacturing good. Labor is a fundamental input in the production
of both goods. The market for A is perfectly competitive, while that for X is monopolis-
tically competitive.
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2.2 Households
All households in N and S have identical preferences. The intertemporal utility function
is such that,
U jt =
Z 1
t
e ( t) lnC1 A;j ()C

X;j()d; (1)
lnCX;j() =
Z 1
0
ln
 
~miX
m=0
m(i)xjmt(i)
!
di; (2)
where  denotes the discount rate, j = N;S is a country index, and 0 <  < 1 is a share
parameter. In the manufacturing sector, the industries continuously exist and the total size
is one. The total expenditure in each period is represented as Ej = PACA;j + PXCX;j ,
where PA is the price of an agricultural good and PX is the aggregate price index of
the manufacturing goods. The intertemporal utility maximization problem yields each
consumption level under a given expenditure: CX;j = Ej=PX andCA;j = (1 )Ej=PA.
As represented in the equations, all households spend  percent of their expenditure on
manufacturing goods and 1   on agricultural goods.
Moreover, by solving the instantaneous utility maximization problem, we can obtain
the demand function of each good in manufacturing sector.
xj~mi =
Ej
p ~mi
(3)
Clearly, all households purchase only the highest-quality ( ~mi) good in each industry, i.
Therefore, we hereafter omit the subscript ( ~mi) from the demand and price for simplicity.
Let nN denote the fraction of the industries that Northern firms produce, and nS be
the fraction of the industries that Southern firms produce. Since the total number of the
industries is 1, this leads to nN + nS = 1. Throughout this section, we assume that all
households in the world consume Southern imitative goods. Then, the composition of the
expenditure for manufacturing goods becomes as follows:
Ej = nNpNx
j
N + nSpSx
j
S (4)
Note that, from (3) and (4), pNxjN = pSxjS holds. Therefore, nN also represents the
fraction of the expenditure on Northern goods.
2.3 Agricultural Goods
All agricultural goods are produced only in South, so Northern households must import
them for the consumption. An agricultural good can be produced by employing one unit
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Figure 2: The production cycle composition.
of labor. Since the market is perfectly competitive, the price of good A is equal to the
Southern wage rate, wS . By defining wS as the numeraire, we obtain PA = wS = 1.
2.4 Manufacturing Goods
Manufacturing goods are produced in both of North and South. Northern firms produce
their original goods and earn a profit until an imitation or innovation in the industry occurs.
Southern firms produce the imitative goods that infringe on IPR of the Northern firms, and
earn a profit until the Southern government detects and seizes them. We assume that the
production of one unit of the good requires one unit of labor in both countries.
Southern potential firms engage in imitative activity by employing labor. As will be
shown later, the wage rate in North, wN , is higher than wS = 1 in equilibrium. Since
the imitator can charge a price that is lower than the marginal cost of the Northern firm
and they engage in Bertrand competition, a successful imitator can exclude the Northern
firm that developed the original good by using the limit-pricing strategy. All imitations
only target Northern goods that have not yet been imitated. Southern firms do not imitate
Southern illegal products because the profit will be zero under Bertrand competition with
other Southern firms.
Northern potential firms devote labor to conducting R&D. All innovation targets only
Northern goods in equilibrium. Innovators’ profit when they innovate a Northern good
will be higher than when they innovate a Southern imitative good because the marginal
cost of the old incumbent (wN ) is higher than the marginal cost of Southern imitators
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(wS = 1). Therefore, a seizure is the only way in which Northern firms may recover their
monopoly in the model.
The Southern government seeks domestic illegal products in each period without any
cost. Once Southern imitators are detected by the government, imitators immediately exit
from the market. Then, the Northern firms that created the original goods regain their
monopoly power and once again serve their products. The confiscation activity is exoge-
nous and the probability of seizure follows a Poisson rate of  2 (0;1). For simplicity,
we assume that imitators are not punished by the government and do not compensate the
Northern firms.
The innovation rate and imitation rate are denoted by zN and zS , respectively. Then,
the product cycle in the model can be illustrated as in Fig 2. The law of motion for nN
and nS can be expressed as follows:
_nN = nS   nNzS and _nS = nNzS   nS: (5)
2.5 Price and Profit
The nearest rival of a Northern firm is the old Northern leader, and the price of a Northern
good is pN = wN , by limit-pricing. Therefore, the profit of a Northern firm is N =
E(1   1). Here, E  EN + ES represents the total world expenditure.
We assume that there are competitive fringes in South that can imitate Southern goods
without a research cost and Southern firms face entry pressure. Competitive fringes can
produce a good by employing  > 1 unit of labor, and wN >  holds in equilibrium.
Since they are the nearest rival of a Southern firm, the price of Southern goods becomes
pS = wS as a result of price competition. The profit of a Southern firm is S = E(1 
 1).
2.6 Asset Market
Let VN denote the firm value of a Northern firm that is not imitated, VNI the firm value of a
Northern firm that is imitated, and VS the firm value of a Southern firm. The stockholders
of these firms can earn a return equal to the sum of the dividend and the capital gain in
each period, while there is a risk of losing the value with a certain probability. In the
equilibrium of the asset market, the period return of each equity must be same as the
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return of other risk-free investments. The no-arbitrage conditions become as follows:
rVN = N + _VN   zS(VN   VNI)  zNVN (6)
rVNI = _VNI   (VNI   VN) (7)
rVS = S + _VS   VS (8)
2.7 Free Entry
We assume that (a=nN)zNdt units of labor are required to attain zNdt, which is the proba-
bility of a successful innovation in an industry in a short term of dt. Similarly, a successful
imitation in an industry, with probability zSdt, needs (b=nN)zSdt units of labor. Here, a
and b are parameters that respectively represent the difficulty of innovation and imitation,
and nN in the denominator means that innovation and imitation become more effective as
the number of the targets increases.5
Free entry into innovation implies that the firm value of the Northern firm, before
imitation, is equal to the cost of innovation:
VN =
awN
nN
: (9)
Similarly, the free-entry condition of imitation can be written as follows:
VS =
b
nN
: (10)
2.8 Labor Market
In the North, labor is allocated between innovation and the production of manufactur-
ing goods. The labor demand must be equal to domestic labor supply in equilibrium.
Therefore, the labor market clearing condition in the North is:
nN

E
wN

+ azN = LN : (11)
5This spillover can be justified by the following interpretation. Suppose that each good potentially has
a different difficulty for innovation and copying. The discovery of a target that is suitable for innovation or
imitation may take some time and incur a cost. However, the discovery becomes easier when the number
of the targets is large. Mathematically, the equation of zS in the steady state becomes too complicated
hyperbolic function of  without this assumption. Therefore, to obtain results clearly, we here assume that
the cost depends on the number of the targets.
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In the South, labor is allocated to imitative activity, the production of imitative goods, and
the production of agricultural goods, as follows:
nS

E


+ (1  )E + bzS = LS (12)
2.9 Trade Balance
Finally, we assume that the trade of both countries balances in each period.
(1  )EN + nSEN = nNES (13)
3 Equilibrium Effects of IPR Enforcement
3.1 Steady State
In the steady state, nN , nS , VN , VNI , VS , EN , and ES are constant over time. Then, we
can obtain the following relationships, which describe the steady state in the model:
nN =

 + zS
; nS =
zS
 + zS
; (14)
VN =
E(1   1)
r + zN + rzS=(r + )
; VS =
E(1   1)
r + 
; (15)
and r = : (16)
By substituting (14)-(16) and free entry conditions into the labor market clearing condi-
tions, we can obtain the imitation rate and innovation rate in the steady state, as follows:
zS =


  (1  )
+ 

; (17)
zN = LN(1   1)=a   1

1 +
zS
+ 

: (18)
where    ( 1 +  1   1) and 
  LS(1    1)=b   (1   ). The imitation
rate does not depend on the innovation rate in the steady state. However, the seizure rate
affects the imitation rate, and we define the imitation rate as zS = ZS(). To ensure the
positiveness of zS and zN , we impose next assumption for parameters.
Assumption 1. The parameters satisfy the following conditions: (i) 
 > (1   ), (ii)
0 <  < 1, and (iii) LN > a [1 + ZS()=(+ )] =(  1).
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Figure 3: An example of the curve of zS .
The condition (i) holds when the population size in the South is sufficiently large.6
The condition (ii) is satisfied when  is sufficiently small. The condition (iii) requires a
sufficiently large population in the North.
3.2 Southern Imitation
First, we investigate the effect of seizure on Southern imitation in the steady state.7 From
(17), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. There is an inverted U-shape relationship between the imitation rate (zS)
and the seizure rate () in (0, ) where   
=(1  ) > 0.
Proof. From (17), ZS(0) = 0 and ZS() = 0 hold. From Assumption 1, ZS() > 0
hold for all  2 (0; ). These indicate that ZS() has at least one vertex on (0,). By
solving Z 0S() = 2 + 2   
=(1   ) = 0, we obtain the solution as follows:
 =  p2 +
=(1  ). One solution is strictly higher than 0. This implies that
ZS() has a unique vertex on (0, ) and the curve is an inverted U-shape, as shown in Fig
3.
The interpretation of the non-monotonic effect of  is as follows. When the seizure
rate is low, many Southern firms are already imitating Northern goods. Since the number
of the targets is small, the new infringement of Northern goods is relatively rare. How-
ever, if Southern government increases the seizure rate, imitators lose their job and then
try to imitate a different Northern good. This reflects the structure of “repeated offenses.”
6This condition can be rewritten as follows:LS > b( 1   1)(+ )=(1   1).
7The equilibrium path in the model is too complex to examine analytically. Therefore, we assume that
there exists a trajectory to the steady state. We then analyze the effect of seizure on imitation, innovation,
and economic growth.
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When  is sufficiently large, seized imitators start to produce agricultural goods rather
than imitate Northern goods because the expected profit becomes very low if they imi-
tate a different good. Therefore, to prevent repeated offenses, the seizure activity of the
Southern government has to be sufficiently frequent.
In addition, the imitation rate (zS) is a decreasing function of b and an increasing func-
tion of .8 In many models, b and  are used as proxies for the strength of IPR protection.
For example,  is usually used as the level of the patent breadth (e.g., Iwaisako, Tanaka,
and Futagami, 2011). Interestingly, the imitation rate (zS) and seizure rate () exhibit a
non-monotonic relationship, while typical IPR measures have a simple monotonic effect
on imitation rate.9
By using Proposition 1, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1. A higher seizure rate necessarily increases (decreases) the number of North-
ern (Southern) firms (nN ).
Proof. From (14) and (17), nN can be calculated as follows:10
nN =

1 +

  (1  )
+ 
 1
(19)
We can find that the second term in the bracket is a decreasing function of . Therefore,
nN is an increasing function of . Then, nS = 1   nN naturally becomes a decreasing
function of .
The increase of  has two effects on nN . First, the more intense seizure activity
directly increases the number of Northern goods because many Northern firms recover
their monopoly. Second, a higher  changes the level of imitative activity and indirectly
affects nN . The indirect effect is not always negative since a higher value of  may induce
repeated offenses. However, the direct effect always dominates the indirect effect in this
model. Therefore, a higher  necessarily increases nN .
Note that both the imitation rate and the number of imitations in each period, nNzS ,
are important. By substituting (17) and (19) into nNzS , we can calculate the number of
8
 is an increasing function of  and a decreasing function of b. In addition,  is a decreasing function
of .
9A small value of b means weak IPR protection of Northern goods in the South, and a large value of
 means strong IPR protection of Southern goods in the South. From the proposition, we can see that
imitation rate is accelerated under a discriminate IPR policy (b # and  ").
10Surprisingly, in spite of the equation nN = =( + zS), nN is strictly greater than 0 when  = 0 in the
steady state. The reason is that nN becomes the indeterminate form of 0=0 because the imitation rate also
goes down to 0, according to  ! 0.
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imitations in each period as follows:
nNz

S =


  (1  )
 + 

; (20)
where   
+. This is also a non-monotonic function of , as the imitation rate is zS .
By same procedure in Proposition 1, we obtain following result.
Proposition 2. In the steady state, there is an inverted U-shape relationship between the
number of imitations (nNzS) and the seizure rate ().
Proof. See Appendix.
From the viewpoint of the number of imitations, a higher seizure rate may also make
many Southern firms begin to imitate Northern goods again. The basic intuition is same
as Proposition 1.
3.3 Northern Innovation and Growth Effect
Second, we examine the effect of seizure on Northern innovation in the steady state. From
(17) and (18), we obtain following result:
Proposition 3. The innovation rate (zN ) is non-monotonic function of the seizure rate ().
The maximum values occur at  = 0 and  = , and the minimum value is attained in the
range  2 (0; ).
Proof. By defining ()  zS=(+ ), the innovation rate is rewritten as follows:
zN = LN(1   1)=a   1 (1 + ()) (21)
As shown in Appendix, () is non-monotonic function of , (0) = () = 0 holds, and
() > 0 holds for all  2 (0; ). In addition, there is a unique vertex on  2 (0; ).
The innovation rate is high when the imitation rate is low, because a low risk of im-
itation stimulates the incentive for innovators. Therefore, the innovation rate basically
exhibits the opposite behavior to that of the imitation rate, as shown in Fig 3 and Fig 4.
A higher seizure rate has several different effects on the innovation incentive. For
example, a large  directly stimulates the incentive because the expected interval of the
non-profit term becomes short (direct effect). However, simultaneously, the imitation rate
may be accelerated, which stifles innovation (indirect effect). When the seizure rate is
small, the probability that new imitations occur is low, which raises the innovation rate.
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Figure 4: An example of the curve of zN .
However, in this case, a higher seizure rate increases the imitation rate, and the negative
indirect effect dominates the positive direct effect. Conversely, when  is sufficiently high,
the indirect effect becomes positive and the higher seizure rate stimulates innovation.
The number of innovations per period is also important because the growth rate in the
model is determined by the expected time of improvement of quality at an instantaneous
moment in time. The growth rate, g, can be calculated as follows:
g = nNz

N ln
=

1 +

  (1  )
+ 
 1 
LN(1   1)=a   1 [1 + ()]

ln: (22)
Although the central motivation is to analyze the growth effect of the seizure rate (),
the functional form of (22) is too difficult to examine analytically. Therefore, the next
subsection studies the growth effect using a numerical method.
Finally, we reveal the sufficient condition that wN >  always holds for all  2 (0; ).
Proposition 4. Suppose that all parameters satisfy the following condition:
a




  1

< LN < 

b
   1   a

: (23)
Then, wN >  always holds for all  2 (0; ).
Proof. See Appendix.
3.4 Numerical Analysis
Using a numerical method, we investigate the effects of seizure on imitation, innovation,
and economic growth. The parameters are LN = 1, LS = 12,  = 1:3,  = 1:05,
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 = 0:03, a = 3, b = 2, and  = 0:8. The size of the quality improvement, , is also
the size of markup. Sener (2006) pointed out that the markup is estimated to be between
1:05 and 1:4, in several empirical studies. We here adopt  = 1:3 from within that range.
Mansfield et al. (1981) found that the ratio of the imitation cost to the innovation cost
is about 2=3. Nonetheless, the ratio in the model is flexible, and changes according to
the Northern wage. Here, we set b = 2 and a = 3. The reason is that the cost of an
illegal imitation is smaller than the cost of an imitation that does not infringe on the IPR
of original products, and therefore 2=3 can be considered an upper bound of the cost ratio.
In the model, wN is always higher than wS = 1. This implies that the maximum cost ratio
in the model is also 2=3 when b = 2 and a = 3. The labor supply of both countries,
LN = 1 and LS = 12, reflects the population-ratio between Japan and China. These
parameters satisfy all assumptions of the model.11
The result is shown in Fig 5. The simulation shows that the growth rate exhibits a
non-monotonic relationship with the strengthening enforcement policy ( "). The inter-
pretation is basically the same as for the innovation rate. However, while the innovation
rate attains a maximum value when  = 0, the growth rate is very low when  = 0. The
reason is that the total number of innovations per period is very small, because the number
of innovation targets is low when  = 0. By increasing the seizure rate from  = 0, al-
though the number of innovation targets increases, the innovation rate decreases because
of the stimulated imitative activity, and the overall effect on innovation becomes negative.
However, the slope of the growth rate turns upward when  is sufficiently large because
the policy effect on the innovation rate becomes positive. Unlike the innovation rate, no
seizure policy ( = 0) is worse in terms of the economic growth.
Numerical Result 1. Although a higher seizure rate does not always increase the growth
rate, the strengthening IPR enforcement ( ") can enhance the growth if the current
seizure rate is larger than a critical value.
Finally, we observe an advantage of the model. In the model, wN represents the
relative wage between North and South. Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) point out
that many quality-ladder-type North-South models have difficulty explaining actual large
wage differences between North and South, as shown in empirical studies. However, the
numerical result shown here includes the area in which the relative wage is larger than the
size of quality gap,  = 1:3.
11The assumption in Proposition 4 is satisfied: 0:6042 < LN = 1 < 1:1973.
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4 Extended Model: Import Restriction
Many countries prohibit the import of imitative goods that infringe on the property rights
of domestic firms, and have recently begun to police this prohibition more vigorously. For
example, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which aims to prohibit trade
of counterfeit goods and pirated copyright products, was signed in 2011. In fact, it seems
that most illegal products are consumed locally. This section considers the effect of the
import restriction on imitations by extending the previous model.
First, we briefly note the main modifications to the model. By the import restric-
tion, Northern households cannot consume Southern imitative goods. Therefore, their
expenditure on manufacturing goods becomes EN = pNxNN . Southern infringers cannot
sell their imitations to Northern households, so their profit naturally decreases. However,
Northern firms that are imitated by Southern infringers can still sell their goods to North-
ern households at the price of pN = wN and earn profit NI . Their period profit becomes
as follows:
NI = EN(1   1) and S = ES(1   1) (24)
The firm value of imitated Northern firms in the steady state also changes, as follows:
VNI =
NI + VN
r + 
(25)
By substituting VNI into VN , we can solve for VN in the steady state:
VN =
 [E + zSEN=(r + )] (1   1)
r + zN + rzS=(r + )
(26)
The labor market clearing conditions are also rewritten, as follows:
EN
wN
+ nN

ES
wN

+ azN = LN (27)
nS

ES


+ (1  )E + bzS = LS (28)
Then the trade balance condition becomes:
(1  )EN = nNES: (29)
By using the same procedure as in the basic model, we can obtain the imitation rate
in the steady state.
zS =

LS(1   1)=b  (+ )
 + 

 (30)
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This equation is similar to that of the basic model, and we can see that zS again describes
an inverted U-shape curve with , by using same procedure in Proposition 1. Clearly, zS
in this model is strictly lower than that in basic model (17) because the numerator in the
bracket in (30) can be rewritten as follows: [
  (1  )] (+). Thus, the imitation
rate in the case of an import prohibition is lower than in the model that allows imports of
imitative goods. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 5. In the steady state, the imitation rate in the case of an import restriction is
necessarily lower than that of the basic model. In addition, there is an inverted U-shape
relationship between the imitation rate and the seizure rate.
Intuitively, because of the import restriction, imitative activity becomes less attractive
since it decreases the imitator’s profit. Therefore, the labor demand for imitative activity
decreases. Although many workers in Southern firms are now released from production,
since imitators can now only sell goods to Southern households, this free labor resource
is used in the production of agricultural goods rather than new imitative activities.
This proposition immediately gives following result:
Corollary 1. The import restriction necessarily decreases nNzS , that is, the number of
new imitations of Northern goods per period.
Proof.
nNz

S =
zS
 + zS
: (31)
This is an increasing function of zS .
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper showed that a higher seizure rate may actually stimulate imitative activity in
South. When the Southern government increased the seizure rate, infringers stop pro-
ducing imitative goods, but then later imitate other goods. The model suggests an ironic
structure of repeat offenses induced by mild seizure activities. Intensive seizure activities
that extirpate illegal imitations are required to decrease infringements and restore the in-
centive for innovation. Paradoxically, the imitation rate is also lowest when the seizure
rate is almost zero in the model. This is because many Southern imitators already earn a
profit by infringing the IPR of Northern goods, so they do not have an incentive to imi-
tate additional products. Although the Northern innovation rate also reaches a maximum
in this case, the growth rate is lower than in the case of intensive seizure activities, as
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shown in the numerical example. Therefore, a policy that stops seizure activities is not
necessarily better, even in this case. We numerically investigated the growth effect of
the eliminative activity of the Southern government and showed that there exists a non-
monotonic relationship. The model in this paper suggests that the strength of the current
policy should be considered by policymakers when deciding on a growth-enhancing regu-
latory policy. Furthermore, as an extension, we introduced an import prohibition policy as
another regulation. This extension to the model showed that import prohibition always has
a negative effect on illegal imitations and can stimulate innovation. Import prohibitions
by other countries may be a more direct method of preventing IPR infringements than
domestic seizure activities. This result indicates that the choice of an effective regulatory
policy is also important to the government.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
By following the proof of Proposition 1, we here prove the shape of nNzS   () in
 2 [0; ] is concave down. From (20), we have  (0) = 0 and  () = 0. In addition,
 () > 0 holds for all  2 (0; ) by the assumption in Proposition 1. Therefore,  () has
at least one vertex in  2 (0; ). If positive  that satisfies  0() = 0 is unique, the vertex
in  2 (0; ) is also unique. From the differentiation by , we obtain
 0() = 0, 2 + 2 1   = 0: (32)
where   
=(  2). The solution of this quadratic equation is given by
 =   1 
p
2 2 +: (33)
Because  is positive,
p
2 2 + is larger than  1. This implies that one solution
of (32) is positive while another is negative. Consequently, a vertex of  () exist in the
positive domain and it must be in  2 (0; ).
The Vertex of ()
The section analyzes the functional form of (), which is defined as below.
()  ZS()=(+ )
=
 

+ 
  
 

+ 

: (34)
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where 
 = 
 + (1  ) and  = 1  . Because ZS(0) = 0 and ZS() = 0 hold, ()
satisfies (0) = () = 0. In addition, () > 0 hold for all  2 (0; ) because ZS() > 0
hold for all  2 (0; ). These mean that () has at least one vertex in  2 (0; ). The
derivative of () is given by
 0() =  


( + )(+ )2
+
 

+ 
  


( + )2

=
()
(+ )2( + )2
: (35)
where ()   (+ 
)2   2 + (
  ). By the definition, 
   equals
to 
. Then,  0() = 0 can be rewritten as follows:
(+ 
)| {z }
+
2 + 2| {z }
+
   
|{z}
+
= 0: (36)
The solution of this quadratic equation is,
 =
 
p
()2 + (+ 
)

+ 

: (37)
At least one of the solutions is negative. From the existence of  that attains a maximum
of () in  2 (0; ), the other must be in  2 (0; ). Therefore, () has a unique solution
, which satisfies  0() = 0, in  2 (0; ).
The Slope of  0()
We can see that the denominator of (35) is an increasing function of  at least in  2 (0; ).
If the (), which is the numerator of (35), is a decreasing function of  in 2 (0; ),  0()
is a decreasing function on (0; ).
() is a quadratic function of  and the curve is concave down. Therefore, if  that
attains the vertex of () is lower than zero, () is a decreasing function of  2 (0; ).
By rewriting (), we obtain next equation:
()   (+ 
)
"
 +

+ 

2
 
 
+ 

2#
+ (
  ): (38)
Above equation indicates that () attains the maximum at ~ such that
~ =  

+ 

< 0: (39)
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Therefore,  0() is a decreasing function at least in  2 (0; ). This implies that  0(0) is
larger than  0() for all  2 (0; ). By (0) = 
, we obtain the value:
 0(0) =



: (40)
Proof of Proposition 4
We assume that  [b=(   1)  a] > LN > a(
=   1). By using (9) and (14)-(18),
wN is calculated as follows:
wN =

+ 
(() + 1) + LN=a
 
b
a(1   1)

 	(): (41)
wN is strictly higher than  when  = 0 because	(0) = b [(1   1)(a+ LN)] 1 >
 holds from the assumption. Therefore, to prove the proposition, it is enough to show
that 	() is increasing function in (0; ). By differentiating 	(), we have
	0() =
[() + 1] + LN=a| {z }
+
  ( + )| {z }
+
 0()
([() + 1] + LN=a)
2| {z }
+

b
a(1   1)

| {z }
+
: (42)
Since the denominator is positive, we only have to check that the numerator is also pos-
itive. We already confirmed that  0() is a decreasing function of  2 (0; ) and  0(0) is
larger than  0(), for all  2 (0; ). Therefore, if 	0(0) > 0 holds, 	() is an increasing
function of  2 (0; ). Using (40) and (42), 	0(0) > 0 can be calculated as follows:
	0(0) =

+ LN=a  
=
(+ LN=a)2
 
b
a(1   1)

: (43)
From the assumption of Proposition 4, the numerator in the first bracket is positive, and
then 	0(0) > 0 holds.
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